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CLIENTS DON'T TAKE SABBATICALS:
THE INDISPENSABLE IN-HOUSE CLINIC
AND THE TEACHING OF EMPATHY
PHILIP M. GENTY*
INTRODUCTION
After almost 12 years in law teaching, I approached my first sab-
batical with a single goal: to free myself from cases. At that time my
clinic clients were primarily parents who were involved in family court
proceedings in which they were trying to preserve their parental rights
and get their children out of the foster care system. Such cases are
emotionally draining for both the client and the lawyer. Thus, while I
welcomed the chance to have a semester off from teaching and attend-
ing faculty and committee meetings, I felt that I needed a break from
the demands of lawyering on behalf of clients.
It did not work out that way. Given that the clinic would not be
taught during my semester off, my dean was less than thrilled about
the idea of hiring a lawyer simply to handle my 25 or so open clinic
cases. At first I was prepared to push the issue, but upon closer exam-
ination of my caseload, I realized the obvious - the handful of espe-
cially demanding cases involved clients to whom the clinic and I had
the greatest personal obligation.
So I spent the next six months doing many things I wanted to do,
as well as the one thing I had not wanted to do: appearing in family
court. But a funny thing happened on the way to the end of the sab-
batical. I came to remember why I had first been drawn to client rep-
resentation and more specifically to clinical teaching. In so doing I
also came, again, to understand the extent to which the in-house, ac-
tual client clinic1 fills a unique and invaluable place in the law school
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1 By "in-house, actual client clinic," I mean a clinic in which the students provide di-
rect representation of clients, and in which the faculty member has ultimate responsibility
for the cases. This definition does not include simulation programs or externship models in
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curriculum.
This realization arose particularly from the two cases that most
required my attention during the sabbatical. In the first, a 20 year-old
woman was attempting to gain custody of her younger siblings who
were in foster care. In the second, a young mother was attempting to
obtain specific performance of an adoption surrender in which she
had been promised, but had failed to get, visits with her child after the
adoption. What stands out is not the fact that both cases went to trial.
Obviously that was an important consideration, but I lost both trials;
arguably the clients would have fared at least as well with another
attorney. The importance of my continued involvement lay else-
where: In both cases the clients were struggling mightily to be taken
seriously by the child welfare and family court systems.
As I prepared these clients for trial and spent long hours with
them in family court, I was struck by the disparity between the clients'
views of themselves, and the agencies' and judges' views of the clients.
In the custody case, my client felt that her siblings were not being
properly cared for by the foster mother and that the child welfare
agency had acquiesced in this marginal level of care for reasons
grounded in racism. My client felt that the agency saw the foster
home as "good enough" for these African American children. The
client believed that her siblings would have much greater opportuni-
ties in life if they were in her care. Conversely, the agency and the
judge saw my client as immature, meddlesome and unrealistic in her
goals for her siblings. In the adoption surrender case, my client felt
that she could continue to play an important and constructive role in
her daughter's life, even after her daughter had been adopted. My
client's perceptions were based on her own experience as a child in
foster care. As with the custody case, the agency and judge had a
markedly different outlook. They saw my client as irresponsible and
selfish, with no real regard for the child's needs. They felt that she
was trying to sabotage the adoptive mother's relationship with the
child.
Over the course of the sabbatical, I therefore came to realize that
in both cases the clients were looking to me to help them be under-
stood and, more importantly, respected. In short, both cases were re-
ally about empathy; my representation of the clients over a period of
years had enabled me, finally, to appreciate their feelings about the
systems with which they had been involved and to discern the role
they wanted me to play in attempting to make the agencies and tribu-
nals comprehend and credit their perspectives and goals.
which students are supervised by practicing attorneys in the host organization. For simplic-
ity, the in-house, actual clinic model will be referred to as "in-house clinic."
[Vol. 7:273
In-House Clinics and Empathy
The experience of working with these two clients - and the in-
sights about them that I gained along the way - caused me to emerge
from the sabbatical with a renewed appreciation for the importance
and rewards of the in-house clinic. On a general level, working di-
rectly with clients and collaborating with students on their clients'
cases keeps clinical teachers involved in the work that brought most of
us to the practice of law in the first place. This is also the experience
our students are seeking when they enroll in a clinic. On a more spe-
cific level, however, my experience with these two clients reminded
me of the importance of teaching empathy to our students. For rea-
sons that I will discuss in this essay, I believe that empathy skills can
be taught only with actual clients and only in an in-house model in
which we are working directly with the students and clients.
THE GOAL OF TEACHING EMPATHY IN CLINICAL COURSES
Empathy is among the most important lawyering skills that stu-
dents can learn in a clinic. It has been described as "the cornerstone of
not only professional interpersonal relations, but also any meaningful
human relationship."' 2 Carrie Menkel-Meadow describes empathy as
"learning how to 'feel with' others .... [L]awyers need to learn to
experience 'the other' from the values that the other holds, not those
of the lawyer .... ." She calls this an "ethic of care."' 3 Empathy thus
involves gaining the client's trust and confidence and attaining an un-
derstanding of the client's substantive goals and aspirations. By con-
necting the lawyer to her or his client in this way, empathy provides
the means of access to all of the other skills that the lawyer must em-
ploy in representing the client.
Part of this notion of empathy involves the lawyer's acquiring an
understanding of the client's "social world" in order to appreciate the
relationships, emotional demands and pressures that define the cli-
ent's day-to-day life.4 However, there is another, equally important,
aspect of empathy, which requires the lawyer to understand the cli-
ent's experiences with and impressions of the legal world. For many
clients, but especially for clients who live in poverty, we might de-
scribe it as an empathy of fear, i.e. an understanding of the client's
deep fear and mistrust of the very legal system upon which the client
2 ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND
NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFEcTIvE REPRESENTATION 117 (1990).
3 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing
from the MacCrate Report - Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH.
L. REV. 593, 620 (1994).
4 See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in
Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1454-55 (1992) (describing empiri-
cal study of divorce cases).
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must rely for a solution to her or his legal problem.5 As one set of
commentators has put it, "[i]n the world of law, unknown rules and
people operating in forbidding surroundings and through alien
processes can influence or decide matters of great moment to
clients. "6
Peter Margulies has described this broad conception of empathy
- which combines an appreciation of the client's social and cultural
world with an understanding of the client's perceptions of the legal
world - as "empathetic engagement." According to Professor Margu-
lies, "[e]mpathetic engagement posits that the micro version of empa-
thy (involving interpersonal relationships) and the macro version
(involving concern about conditions of political, social, and economic
subordination in society) are complementary, not radically separate."'7
For indigent clients, this experience with the world of law is
fraught with difficulty. There is a chronic lack of access to lawyers,
and the dynamics of the court system make it impossible for clients to
present their claims adequately and to protect their rights.8 Further-
more, clients may be afraid even to attempt to use the legal system.
Gerald L6pez has described this phenomenon among low-income
women of color:
Apparently, in order to use law... and lawyers, many low-income
women of color must overcome fear, guilt, and a heightened sense
of destruction. In their eyes, such a decision often amounts to noth-
5 Jane Spinak has discussed these aspects of empathy in the context of her representa-
tion of a foster mother seeking to adopt her foster children. Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on
a Case (Of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1990 (1995). Although indigent clients prob-
ably feel this fear most acutely, this is an issue for other clients as well. For example,
several years ago, two friends asked me to represent them in a landlord-tenant matter. The
issues were simple and could have been handled by any marginally competent attorney.
What was striking was the terror that these two college-educated women felt as they en-
tered the courtroom. What they valued, even more than a favorable outcome in the pro-
ceeding, was emotional support and guidance to help them understand and deal with the
experience. Although my experience is in litigation, and this essay is primarily focused on
teaching in a litigation clinic, I believe that many of these issues also apply to transactional
work.
6 Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 4, at 1455.
7 Peter Margulies, Re-framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 CLIN. L. REv.
605, 615 (1999); see also Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education,
45 STAN. L. REv. 1731, 1748-50 (1993) (describing the importance of appreciating both the
legal and social worlds of the client). Stephen Ellmann has discussed the related concept
of "approval," which he distinguishes from empathy. Professor Ellmann defines "ap-
proval" as comprising loyalty, respect, warmth, advice and understanding. Stephen
Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 994-1005 (1992). Loyalty, respect
and understanding are aspects of what I am here describing as empathy.
8 See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533 (1992); Homer C. La Rue,
Developing an Identity of Responsible Lawyering Through Experimental Learning, 43 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1147 (1992).
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ing less intimidating than taking on conventional power with rela-
tively little likelihood of meaningful success . . . . And it seems
inevitably to entail making your life entirely vulnerable to the law -
with its powers to unravel the little you've got going for yourself
and your family. In effect, turning to law and lawyers seems to sig-
nify a formal insurrection of sorts - an insurrection that, at least for
these low-income women of color, foreshadows discomfiting exper-
iences and negative consequences.9
Thus, empathetic lawyering requires the lawyer to look at the le-
gal system through the client's eyes. In addition, the lawyer must pre-
pare the client for, and guide the client through, an encounter with
that system. This is, of course, an exceedingly complicated role, for
the lawyer is, at one time, both a part of the mistrusted legal system
and the client's only practical means of gaining access to and results
from that system. The attorney is an officer of the court with an alle-
giance to a legal system that her or his clients experience as unjust.
The empathy skills involved in preparing a client for and taking the
client through the fearful experience of a legal proceeding are there-
fore among the most difficult to master.
This empathetic role involves skills similar to that of a leader of
an expedition: The attorney must accompany the client into a strange
region with its own language and cultural customs and must bring the
client through the experience safely. One writer has suggested that
this may involve the lawyer's sharing of her or his position of power
and privilege with the client to provide the client with access to the
legal system.' 0 The lawyer's role has also been described as one of
"translator":
The lawyer as translator... does not act as mere intermediary be-
tween the client and the legal system. Instead, the lawyer acts as
facilitator, one who enables dialogue across lines of social difference
between the client, law, and legal decisionmaker.... Although the
lawyer as translator may be a useful metaphor for all types of law-
yering, it is an imperative for poverty law practice. As Lucie White
has stated: "The gap between what poor people want to say and
what the law wants to hear often seem enormous." The job of pov-
erty lawyers should be to fill that gap."
9 Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1, 8 (1989).
10 Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality," 4 CLIN. L.
REV. 1, 20-21 (1997).
11 Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory
of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 917 (1992) (quoting Lu-
cie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to
Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 545 (1987-88)); see also Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs.
G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990) (describing the experience of representing a client in a
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Through this form'of translation, the lawyer puts empathy into action.
Thus, empathy is complex and multifaceted. For that reason the
teaching of empathy skills is one of the most challenging goals of
clinical legal education.
THE TEACHING OF EMPATHY IN A FIELDWORK SETrING
The teaching of these empathy skills needs to take place at all
three stages of the clinical learning process: planning, doing and re-
flecting. At the planning stage, the teacher works alongside the stu-
dents on development of strategy and, in the litigation context, to help
the students prepare for an encounter with the tribunal. 12 Here, as at
all stages of the representation, the students need an empathetic un-
derstanding of the client's goals and fears. As clients approach a legal
proceeding, they have many hard, practical questions for the students:
Who is the judge/hearing officer? What will s/he think about who I
am? What will the opposing attorney say about me? Will the opposing
attorney know about and bring up the subjects about which I am most
sensitive? What is the likely outcome? At the planning stage the
teacher will help the students gain insights about their clients.
The teaching of empathy continues at the "doing" stage when the
instructor accompanies the students and the client to court. Here, the
teacher performs at least two functions. First, as in the planning stage,
the teacher acts as co-counsel with the students, sharing the responsi-
bilities, risks and uncertainties of the court experience. 13 The teacher
is subject to many of the same fears and uncertainties that the stu-
dents and client are experiencing. The teacher must deal with the
same client anxiety and mistrust, the same fluid environment, the
welfare administrative hearing).
12 See Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109 (1993-1994) (providing thoughtful, detailed descrip-
tion of the process of preparing students). See also Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis
of Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 344-50 (1982) (discussing co-counsel
relationship between teacher and student). A "co-counsel" relationship between the
teacher and the student may take many forms. In my clinic I typically work fairly closely
with the students on their cases. We collectively "brainstorm" about possible strategies and
the pros and cons of various options, and I share my own uncertainties with them. My
purpose is not to take "ownership" of the case away from the students, but rather to con-
vey that we are all responsible to the client and that I do not necessarily know which
approach is most likely to achieve the client's goals. With respect to client meetings,
whether I participate will depend on a number of factors. If I already have a relationship
with the client, or if we are preparing for a hearing, I am more likely to be present for the
meeting; otherwise, the students will generally meet with the client alone. For hearings,
the students and I usually divide responsibilities. For example, the students might conduct
the direct examinations, and I might handle the cross-examinations.
13 See La Rue, supra note 8, at 1153-55. See also description of co-counsel role, supra
note 12.
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same temperamental and unpredictable judge. The teacher is com-
pletely exposed, as the students look to the teacher for advice and
assistance to make this situation comprehensible, less painful and ulti-
mately successful for the client. Such direct involvement enhances the
students' educational experience. It also enhances the teacher's credi-
bility in the eyes of the students and the client.14
The second function performed by the teacher in the courtroom
is that of guide for the students. The teacher helps the students make
sense of what is transpiring. 15 Sitting in court with the client, the stu-
dents will feel the client's anxieties as the client watches them negoti-
ating with opposing counsel. They will know that the client is
watching for alliances: Are the students too friendly with opposing
counsel? Will the students advocate forcefully or will they compro-
mise? In the courtroom, the students will feel the client's fear of the
judge and uncertainty about whether the judge can be made to under-
stand who the client is. The teacher needs to be present in order to
help frame this learning experience for the students. In this way the
teacher facilitates the student's empathetic understanding of the cli-
ent's perspective.
Without the instructor's presence, the students may be over-
whelmed by - or perhaps worse - oblivious to the complexities of the
courtroom interactions. Students are typically from the same privi-
leged background as the opposing attorneys and the judge.' 6 More-
over, practicing attorneys and judges are frequently guest speakers at
law school events and are presented as role models for the students.
It would therefore be natural for the students, in the midst of a con-
fusing and intimidating courtroom experience, to ally themselves with
these professional role models rather than with the client.
Homer La Rue has described the pressures that students face
when they enter this courtroom setting:
The student-lawyer coming into this milieu is understandably con-
fused, perhaps also a little daunted by the maze of people and pro-
cedure. She is faced with the difficult question of what it means to
be a lawyer .... The student's strong inclination is to look to the
14 One aspect of this relates to role-modeling, about which Minna Kotkin has written.
See Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Legal Education, 19 N.M.
L. REV. 185 (1989). In an in-house clinic the students are able to watch the way in which
we clinical teachers approach cases, relate to clients and interact with other attorneys and
judges. This experience is invaluable for the students, and, as I suggest below, for us.
15 See Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the
Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLIN. L. REV. 37, 60 (1995) (terming the
clinical instructor a "guide by the side").
16 This is, of course, a generalization, but even those students who come from back-
grounds similar to those of their clients may be "socialized" by their law school experiences
to identify with the institutional actors.
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role - the mores, attitudes, and behavior of the profession - for gui-
dance regarding how to be and how to act. Deeper questions about
the student's reactions to this scene and her connection with it are
tucked away into the background. 17
The teacher can help the students understand these complex power
dynamics and resist a shifting of alliances away from the client.
Again, the students need to continue to employ empathy, i.e. seeing
the courtroom experience through the client's eyes. The teacher,
working alongside the students and the client, will help ensure that
this occurs.
After the courtroom experience, the teacher must work col-
laboratively with the students at the reflecting or de-briefing stage.
For many students, the courtroom experience will have been what
Fran Quigley calls a "disorienting moment," i.e. "when the learner
confronts an experience that is disorienting or even disturbing because
the experience cannot be easily explained by reference to the learner's
prior understanding - referred to in learning theory as 'meaning
schemes' - of how the world works."'18 Professor Quigley sees such
"disorienting moments" as an opportunity for a transformative experi-
ence for the adult learner:
If an experience is unsettling or puzzling or somewhat incongruous
with our present meaning structure, it captures our attention. If the
gap is too great between how we understand the world and our-
selves in it and the experience, we may choose to ignore it or reject
it. If however we choose to grapple with it, learning results. Some
of this learning affects us more than others. Powerful learning ex-
periences may even transform how we think and act. 19
Because the teacher and students will have shared this experience, the
teacher will be in an ideal position to facilitate the students' learning
by engaging the students in collaborative reflection about the client's
encounter with the legal system. 20
Professor La Rue discusses an experience he shared with one of
his students, a white male, who was representing an African American
client before a white judge in Rent Court. The judge, in siding com-
pletely with the white male landlords and rejecting the client's request
for relief, had reduced the client to tears of frustration. After the
17 La Rue, supra note 8, at 1150.
18 Quigley, supra note 15, at 51.
19 Id.
20 See Shalleck, supra note 12, at 164-67 (describing the process of de-briefing the stu-
dents after a joint court appearance); see also Frank S. Bloch, Framing the Clinical Experi-
ence: Lessons on Turning Points and the Dynamics of Lawyering, 64 TENN. L. REv. 989,
1008 (1997) (noting that learning lessons are most powerful when they are presented simul-
taneously to the student and teacher through shared experiences on cases).
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court appearance, the student reflected upon the experience with Pro-
fessor La Rue:
[Tihe student... remarked that the judge never really saw who his
client was. The judge only saw a poor person of color and assumed
that she was trying to get more than that to which she was entitled.
He was genuinely outraged at the judge's inability or unwillingness
to see past her racial and class biases. The student noticed how his
own desire to "win" pushed him to identify with his client in a way
that permitted him to experience, if only for a moment, the
powerlessness of a person who lives her life in a state of
subordination. 21
Professor La Rue was able to use this shared courtroom experience to
help the student develop a deeper level of empathy with the client.
CAN EMPATHY BE TAUGHT IN CONTEXTS OTHER THAN AN
IN-HOUSE FIELDWORK SETTING?
These, then, are the skills that we want to teach our students. In
order to develop empathy, our students must gain some firsthand ex-
posure to the client's experience of the legal world. While we may not
express the goal explicitly, we want our students to experience the
hostility that is directed at clients, and often at the clients' advocates
as well, in the tribunals of poverty: the family courts that take away
their children, the welfare hearings that take away their means of sub-
sistence, the landlord-tenant courts that take away their homes and
the criminal courts that take away their freedom. 22
Students may also get a "window" into their clients' lives by
means other than going to court. Professor Quigley describes the
profound effect upon one of his students of interviewing a client in a
battered women's shelter:
[Tihe student unexpectedly stopped the interview and, visibly
shaken, approached the supervisor to request permission to end his
involvement in the case. When asked why he was unable to respond
to the client, a single mother and rape victim struggling with both
the criminal justice and welfare systems, the student said, "Her life
is so messed up, I don't know how to respond. She has so many
21 La Rue, supra note 8, at 1154-55.
22 Clinical teachers have written about the impact that going to court has had upon
students' perceptions of their clients. See Shalleck, supra note 12, at 171-72 (describing
how students' observations of another family offense court case made it possible for them
to understand how the structure of the court system affected their client and helped them
to explain the court system to their client); Barbara Bezdek, Reconstructing a Pedagogy of
Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1170-72 (1992) (discussing the ways in which stu-
dents' experiences assisting low income tenants in Rent Court created a heightened aware-




problems I don't see a way out of her situation. '23
Jane Harris Aiken has suggested that students may have similar types
of revelatory experiences when they interview their clients in the cli-
ents' homes, wait in welfare agency lines with them or accompany
them to meetings with caseworkers, doctors or court personnel:
"[V]enturing into the client's world should increase the likelihood of
developing a critical understanding of power and privilege. '24
These aspects of client representation cannot be simulated; they
must be experienced. Simulations are too neat. Real-life advocacy is
confusing, intimidating, unpredictable and messy, and our students
need to know this. Moreover, students need to experience the com-
plexities of dealing with an actual client. If there is a baseline concept
underlying clinical education, it is the importance of a client context
for learning and understanding the law.
Of course, simulations play a critical role in clinical education. To
some extent all clinical models use simulations to teach a core set of
lawyering skills. The simulations are carefully crafted and often vide-
otaped, and the students are rigorously critiqued. Case planning, ne-
gotiation and settlement, drafting and research and trial techniques -
all of these may be taught through a combination of simulation exer-
cises and fieldwork experiences. Simulations are an attractive way of
teaching many of these skills because of the degree of pedagogical
control that the teacher is able to exert over the student's experience
and learning. Simulations are also an important way to prepare and
critique students before they start to work with actual clients. The use
of simulations minimizes the extent to which clients are "guinea pigs"
for the students' learning.
Even the most carefully crafted simulation, however, inevitably
involves a degree of artificiality that prevents the students from taking
the experience as seriously, and learning as deeply, as they would if an
actual client were involved. Simulations are inherently limited by the
fact that the "client" is a creation or extension of the teacher. Ann
Shalleck has written about the problems inherent in using such "con-
structed" clients in law teaching:
[T]he constructed clients ... force out the real clients. Students do
not see the worlds that the clients come from, the institutions that
shape the clients' lives, and the choices, or the conflicts, confusion,
and uncertainty that some bring with them to the lawyer's office.
Students have no sense of how hard it often is to identify what a
client wants, nor do they develop any insight into how they them-
selves can participate in shaping clients' understanding of the cli-
23 Quigley, supra note 15, at 53-54.
24 Aiken, supra note 10, at 46.
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ent's goals. Students do not learn how to attend to the ways power
operates within their client relationships, nor are they taught the
role it can play in the definition of client interests. 25
In short, a simulation does not allow students to feel the coercive
power of the legal system and to understand their client's fear of, and
responses to, that power. In order to learn the skills of empathy, our
students need to be able to work with actual clients. But we teachers
need to be there with them.
Like simulations, externships are an inadequate substitute for an
in-house clinic with respect to teaching empathy. If the essence of
lawyering is the shared experience of the attorney and the client, the
essence of clinical teaching is the shared experience of the teacher and
the student in interactions with and advocacy on behalf of the client.26
In an externship this quality is absent, because the clinic instructor is
not working directly with the students and their clients. An in-house
clinic, in contrast, involves a complex interrelationship among the
teacher, the student and the client, played out against the backdrop of
the legal forum in which the client's case will be adjudicated.27
The literature on adult learning, or "andragogy," stresses that the
most effective adult learning occurs in such a setting, where the
teacher and student are working collaboratively.28 In the context of
clinical legal education, this means that the teacher and student are
working as co-counsel. While the division of responsibility has to be
worked out on a case-by-case and student-by-student basis, teachers
and students will work together throughout the representation of the
client.29
Thus, it is not enough that the student be responsible to an actual
client; the ideal learning environment requires that the teacher share
this responsibility. The student's learning will be enhanced if she or
he knows that the teacher has a direct, professional stake in the out-
25 Shalleck, supra note 7, at 1739 (describing limitations of the "cardboard," "con-
structed clients" used in doctrinal classroom hypotheticals and professional responsibility
classes). See also Bloch, supra note 12, at 347-48 ("Actual client representation is real and,
therefore, andragogically effective. Simulations, on the other hand, are recognized as imag-
inary and thus are less effective as learning experiences .... "); Quigley, supra, note 15 at
69-70 (arguing that simulations unconnected to work with actual clients are not effective
tools for teaching about social justice).
26 See Catherine Gage O'Grady, Preparing Students for the Profession: Clinical Educa-
tion, Collaborative Pedagogy, and the Realities of Practice for the New Lawyer, 4 CLIN. L.
REv. 485, 516 (1998) (terming supervision of a student's work with clients "perhaps the
primary teaching methodology for the clinical teacher").
27 See Nina W. Tarr, Current Issues in Clinical Legal Education, 37 How. L.J. 31, 45
(1993) (discussing the dynamics of the "triangular relationship" among the student, teacher
and client).
28 See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 12.
29 See description of co-counsel role, supra note 12.
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come of the case, or to put this more bluntly, that the teacher's own
reputation and license are on the line.30 In addition, students will see
that even their instructor, an experienced attorney, does not have all
of the answers and must deal with the unexpected. 31 It is this com-
plete collaboration that makes the in-house clinic a unique educa-
tional experience for the law student. In contrast, externships involve
a disconnect between the planning/reflection stages and the doing
stage of the teaching, and this creates a break in the chain of learning.
As a result, externships, like simulations, are not well-suited for the
teaching of empathy.
CONCLUSION
Although this essay focuses on a single dimension of in-house
clinical instruction - the teaching of empathy - there are, of course,
many more things that could be said about the unique educational
value of the in-house clinic model.32 The in-house clinic remains, in
short, an essential component of legal education. I am concerned,
however, that experienced clinical teachers are, increasingly, moving
away from in-house models. I therefore want to offer some conclud-
ing observations about the risk that the future of such clinics may be
jeopardized by the very success that clinical educators have had in
enhancing our status within the legal academy.
Although the first clinical teachers were drawn from public inter-
est law practice and were typically hired at low salaries, with limited
job security and no professorial titles or rights,33 clinical teachers have
worked for and secured significant improvements in status. Today,
while important disparities remain, more of these teachers are tenured
or on tenure track, and many now have at least rough salary parity
with their non-clinical colleagues. A by-product of this enhanced sta-
tus is that clinical teachers are increasingly being allowed or even
asked to teach doctrinal courses in addition to, or sometimes instead
of, clinical courses.
This is all a wonderful development and worth rejoicing. But
these gains have not been without costs. Clinical teachers now have
30 See O'Grady, supra note 26, at 515.
31 See Shalleck, supra note 12, at 149 ("[U]npredictable events often offer the most
powerful insights into being a lawyer .... ").
32 Another important dimension is explored by Deborah Maranville in her article, Pas-
sion, Context, and Lawyering Skills: Choosing Among Simulated and Real Clinical Exper-
iences, in this issue of the Clinical Law Review. For discussion of other facets, see, e.g.,
Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508
(1992).
33 See PHILIP G. SCHRAG & MICHAEL MELTSNER, REFLECrIONS ON CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION 7-8 (1998).
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more freedom to choose what they want to teach, but this often comes
with a new pressure to produce scholarship. In-house clinics are ex-
tremely labor intensive; teachers must spend hours with students pre-
paring for and appearing in court proceedings, mediation sessions or
transactional events. When the students are not around, client emer-
gencies arise, and the teachers must attend to these. In the court-
room, the clinical teacher is at the mercy of an often impatient judge
who may see the teacher's educational objectives as an unnecessary
burden on an overcrowded court docket. Simulation courses and ex-
ternships thus become increasingly attractive options for the harried
clinical teacher.
As clinical teachers enjoy enhanced status, and as we grow older,
the temptation to move away from direct representation of clients
therefore increases. Most of us started our careers in programs that
provide direct services, and we may be bored or "burned-out" or sim-
ply eager to move into novel "cutting-edge" areas of teaching, rather
than continuing to teach in the labor-intensive, traditional, in-house
client representation clinic model. 34
But we must always be conscious of the choices we are making
and the consequences of those choices. Whatever the advantages of
moving in new directions, I believe that something precious is being
lost. What has always set us apart from our non-clinical colleagues is
that we are able to take our students outside the classroom and show
them the legal system as clients experience it. If clinical teachers are
34 Law school deans have their own reasons for disfavoring in-house clinics. Students
are now provided with "experiential learning" throughout the curriculum, using models
that are less costly than in-house clinics. Required first-year skills programs use simulations
to introduce students to a wide range of lawyering skills, including writing, research, inter-
viewing and counseling. See RALPH L. BRILL, SUSAN L. BRODY, CHRISTINA L. KUNz,
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & MARILYN R. WALTER, SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRITING
PROGRAMS 34-36 (1997) (noting increasing inclusion of instruction in interviewing, coun-
seling and negotiation in first-year legal writing courses). New upper-level simulation
courses in interviewing and counseling, negotiation, drafting and professional responsibil-
ity, as well as externship and pro bono offerings have been added. In addition, "experien-
tial" teaching techniques have been introduced into traditional doctrinal courses, e.g.
drafting exercises in Contracts and case simulations in Civil Procedure. Larry Grosberg,
Elizabeth Schneider and Jeff Stempel were some of the pioneers of this movement in Civil
Procedure through the use of the Buffalo Creek litigation materials. The extent to which
these techniques have become part of mainstream education is apparent from the inclusion
of Buffalo Creek pleadings in the newest edition of a leading Foundation Press Civil Proce-
dure text. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., COLIN C. TAIT & WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, PLEAD-
ING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDERAL, CASES AND MATERIALS 595-607, 655-62 (8t'
ed. 1999). In addition, that same company has published the litigation materials from A
Civil Action for use in Civil Procedure courses. LEWIs A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G.
VAUGHN, A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIwL ACTION (1999). Given this range of
"experiential learning" opportunities, deans may question the value of the more expensive,
traditional in-house clinics.
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to remain true to our calling, we must not entirely abandon our direct
involvement in client representation. For the sake of our students'
education, as well as our own, we must continue to accompany our
students and their clients, and share their fear and uncertainty, on
their journey through the legal system.
